Report: Impact of the New U.S. Port Fee Policy on Gemadept and Gemalink

1. Background of the New U.S. Policy

In April 2025, the U.S. government announced a special port fee policy targeting ships built in China when they call at U.S. ports. The aim of this policy is to reverse China's dominance in the global shipbuilding industry and to incentivize shipbuilding within the U.S., following findings that China benefited from unfair state subsidies. According to the U.S. Trade Representative, maritime transport is critical to the U.S. economy, and action is needed to reduce supply chain risks from dependence on Chinese-built vessels.

Policy details: Fees are imposed per U.S. voyage (not per port call) and will gradually increase from late 2025 through 2028:

• Ships owned by Chinese carriers (e.g., COSCO, OOCL):

  • 180-day exemption,

  • $50 per deadweight ton starting October 14, 2025,

  • increases to $80 (from April 17, 2026), $110 (from April 17, 2027), and $140/ton in 2028,

  • maximum of 5 chargeable voyages per ship per year.

• Ships not owned by Chinese firms but built in China:

  • Lower rate: $18/ton deadweight (about $120 per container) from October 14, 2025,

  • increases to $33/ton (about $250/container) in 2028.

• RoRo vessels (car carriers) built outside the U.S.:

  • $150 per car (CEU) after the 180-day exemption, from around October 2025.

• Phase 2 of the policy will include LNG carriers after 3 years, with a 22-year rollout plan.

• Exemptions: The policy excludes U.S. domestic routes on the Great Lakes, Caribbean region, U.S. territories, and bulk exports such as coal and grain. Empty vessels entering the U.S. are also exempt.

Initially, the surcharge was proposed at extremely high levels (up to $1.5 million per call for vessels with Chinese elements) but was later adjusted after opposition from more than 300 logistics firms during March 2025 hearings. Many argued it would be counterproductive, since Chinese-built vessels are expected to account for up to 98% of the global commercial fleet in the near future. As a result, the final policy implemented a tiered fee structure and clarified distinctions between ownership and origin of construction.

Summary: As of late 2025, any large container ship built in China transporting cargo to the U.S. will incur a significant additional fee. This is likely to increase logistics costs for exporters from countries like Vietnam, particularly if shipping lines pass on the surcharge via higher freight rates.

2. Main Shipping Routes at Gemadept and Gemalink Ports

Gemalink is a major deep-water container port located in the Cai Mep – Thi Vai port cluster (Ba Ria - Vung Tau). Operational since early 2021, the port is a joint venture between Gemadept (41.67% ownership) and CMA Terminals (a member of the CMA-CGM Group from France). Phase 1 of Gemalink has a design capacity of 1.5 million TEUs/year and can receive container vessels up to 200,000 DWT (~18,000–20,000 TEUs), ranking it among only 19 ports globally capable of handling such megaships. With a deep draft (-15.5 meters), Gemalink enables Vietnamese exports to sail directly to distant markets like the U.S. West Coast or Europe without needing to transship via secondary ports.

From its inauguration, Gemalink began servicing important international shipping routes. For instance, the first commercial ship calling Gemalink (January 2021) was part of the JAX Asia–U.S. route operated by CMA CGM. Since then, the port has mainly served long-haul routes from the Ocean Alliance (CMA CGM, COSCO/OOCL, Evergreen)—the largest shipping alliance globally, dominating Asia–Europe and Trans-Pacific services. In 2022, Gemalink added the AEU7 Asia–Europe route of COSCO/OOCL, and by early 2025, the Premier Alliance (HMM, ONE, Yang Ming) also designated Gemalink as its Vietnam stop on the Asia–Europe service.

In contrast, Gemadept’s northern port cluster (Nam Dinh Vu, Hai Phong) primarily handles intra-Asia and domestic feeder routes. According to Gemadept, U.S.-bound cargo represents less than 10% of Nam Dinh Vu's volume. Cargo from Hai Phong to the U.S. typically transits through Singapore or Hong Kong. On the other hand, Gemalink handles a significantly larger share of U.S. shipments since it directly services Trans-Pacific lines. In 2024 and Q1 2025, about 32% of Gemalink’s container throughput was destined for the U.S.

Port Area	U.S.-bound Cargo Share
Nam Dinh Vu (Hai Phong)	< 10% (mainly intra-Asia)
Gemalink (Cai Mep)	~32% (2024–Q1/2025); ~20% after Q2/2025

Note: Starting April 2025, Gemalink attracted 4 new international services (to Africa, Europe, Canada, and South America), reducing its U.S. shipment share to about 20%. This diversification reflects a strategic response by Gemadept to U.S. market risks.

Most vessels calling at Gemalink are large container ships (several thousand to 18,000+ TEUs), many built in Chinese shipyards. For example, COSCO/OOCL (China) often uses domestically built ships of 14,000–21,000 TEU for Asia–Europe and Asia–U.S. routes. In March 2023, Gemalink welcomed the OOCL Spain (~24,000 TEU, built in 2023) on the LL3 Asia–Europe route. The selection of Gemalink by top-tier Chinese carriers confirms the port’s capability to accommodate megaships and meet stringent operational demands. However, it also means a considerable portion of Gemalink’s U.S.-bound volume involves Chinese-built vessels (regardless of ownership).

As a result, the new U.S. port fee will have an indirect impact: from late 2025, vessels departing Gemalink to the U.S. that were built in China will incur fees of $18/ton (or ~$120/container). If the vessel is owned by a Chinese carrier (e.g., COSCO/OOCL), the fee rises to $50/ton from 2025, increasing to $140/ton by 2028. This may force shipping lines to consider redeploying their fleets (e.g., substituting Chinese-built vessels with Korean/Japanese-built ones) or absorb higher costs when docking in the U.S.

Conclusion: Gemalink serves as a vital international gateway for Vietnam, with Trans-Pacific routes playing an essential role (even after the U.S.-bound volume dropped to ~20%). Other Gemadept ports (like Nam Dinh Vu) are less exposed to U.S. trade and thus less affected by the new U.S. policy.

3. Role of Gemalink in the Export Supply Chain

Gemalink plays a strategic gateway role in Vietnam’s export supply chain, especially for containerized seaborne cargo. Thanks to its capacity to receive the largest mother vessels, Gemalink allows Vietnamese exports—such as textiles, footwear, furniture, electronics—to be shipped directly to distant markets like the U.S. and Europe without transshipment through ports like Singapore or Hong Kong. This reduces time and logistics costs, enhancing the competitiveness of Vietnamese goods. Deputy Minister of Transport Nguyen Xuan Sang has noted that Vietnam’s deep-water ports enjoy low handling costs and can accommodate megaships, thus improving export potential.

As the largest terminal in the Cai Mep–Thi Vai cluster, Gemalink accounted for approximately 22% of throughput in 2022 and aims to expand its market share to 30–35% after completing Phase 2 of development. Gemalink functions as a central hub in Gemadept’s logistics ecosystem—connected to satellite ports, inland container depots (ICDs), warehouses, and trucking fleets—ensuring efficient cargo flows nationwide. Goods from industrial zones across Vietnam can be consolidated at Gemalink for export or distributed internally after import.

Currently, Gemalink does not play a major role in automobile logistics. Vietnam’s auto exports are still limited (with only VinFast exporting vehicles to the U.S., mainly via Hai Phong in the north), and car imports are typically handled by specialized terminals near Ho Chi Minh City. Therefore, Gemalink’s involvement in the automotive supply chain is minimal for now. However, if future auto exports from southern Vietnam increase, Gemalink could serve this segment (its berths and yard space can support RoRo vessels with proper investment). In that case, the new U.S. fee of $150 per car for foreign-built RoRo vessels would become relevant, potentially increasing shipping costs per vehicle.

Summary: Gemalink is a key node in Vietnam’s container export chain, enabling direct connections to strategic markets. Any disruption affecting U.S.-bound cargo flows—the largest export market for Vietnam (worth $31.4 billion in Q1/2025)—will have a tangible impact on Gemalink and its owner, Gemadept.

4. Potential Impact on Volume, Revenue, and Profit

1. Container throughput: The new U.S. port fee is an added cost barrier on the U.S. route. While the surcharge targets carriers, its effect could slow Vietnamese exports to the U.S. Exporters may reconsider product mix or pricing to offset increased shipping costs. Mr. Truong Hien Phuong (KIS Securities) noted that port-related stocks have been affected by the U.S. tariff policy, due to potential slowdowns in two-way trade. As exporters reassess orders and shipment pace, container volumes may decline, dragging down port revenues and profits.

BSC Securities reports that the U.S. accounts for nearly one-third of Vietnam’s trade and about 30% of total port cargo volume. Thus, BSC forecasts a decline in container throughput for 2025 compared to 2024, with ports among the most negatively impacted sectors (alongside textiles, seafood, wood, rubber). The effect is especially pronounced at deep-water ports like Cai Mep–Thi Vai, which concentrate U.S.-bound routes. If Gemalink loses 20–30% of its volume due to weaker U.S. trade, its overall throughput may stagnate or decline if other routes can’t fill the gap. After growing 32% in 2024, Gemalink may face slower growth or even contraction in the short term.

While Gemadept is attracting alternative cargo (via new services), it won’t be easy to fully replace U.S.-bound volume quickly. In a worst-case scenario, if 20% of current volume is lost, Gemalink’s terminal revenue will fall accordingly, impacting Gemadept’s consolidated earnings. In a more optimistic scenario, if new routes and growing intra-Asia trade offset losses, the impact will be milder (slower growth rather than decline).

2. Revenue and profitability: Gemalink generates revenue mainly from terminal handling charges (THC) and related logistics services. These earnings scale with volume. If container throughput drops while operating costs (e.g., berth, equipment, labor) remain fixed, profit margins will shrink. Gemalink, although a new port, has been profitable since its first year—earning VND 2 billion in 2021 and VND 83.9 billion in 2022. Profits were expected to rise sharply as the port ramps up to full capacity. However, the U.S. trade shock may dampen this growth, possibly flattening or reducing profits in 2025 if throughput drops sharply.

On the stock market, investors have already priced in concerns: port stocks fell sharply in early April 2025 when the policy was announced and only recovered when the U.S. postponed immediate implementation (providing a 180-day grace period). Some port operators have issued cautious 2025 guidance: Viconship (VCS) expects 2025 pre-tax profit to drop 42% year-on-year despite flat revenue. This forecast was made before the U.S. fee was finalized, so further downward revision may occur. Hai Phong Port (PHP) initially targeted a 12.8% profit increase in 2025, but analysts doubt this is achievable under current market conditions. Gemadept has yet to release 2025 guidance as of April 2025, likely awaiting further clarity on the policy’s real impact.

Mitigating factors:

• Implementation timing: The fee begins in mid-October 2025, leaving months for preparation. The initial $18/ton rate for Chinese-built ships is modest relative to total freight costs (1–2% per container). The phased increases to 2028 allow time for carriers and ports to adapt fleet deployment and schedules. For example, Chinese-built ships can be reassigned to non-U.S. routes while Korean/Japanese-built ships take over U.S. lines. USTR itself acknowledged the need to soften implementation to avoid supply chain shocks.

• Higher U.S. imports: Conversely, imports from the U.S. to Vietnam may rise. Vietnam is reducing tariffs on many U.S. imports and has strong demand for strategic U.S. goods (renewable energy equipment, high-tech machinery, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors). To reduce trade surplus pressure with the U.S., Vietnam may import more of these goods, boosting inbound cargo. Although imports are a smaller share of total volume, strong growth could partly offset export losses and contribute additional revenue (as inbound and outbound handling fees are similar). Gemadept emphasized this opportunity: rising U.S. imports may accelerate Phase 2 of Gemalink.

Summary: Gemadept/Gemalink’s revenue and profit in 2025 are expected to come under pressure due to potential U.S.-bound volume decline. The exact impact depends on how well other cargo sources compensate and how shipping lines respond. If lines find optimal workarounds (e.g., rerouting, fleet rotation), the effect may be modest. But if U.S.–Vietnam trade weakens significantly, Gemalink may face a difficult year. Experts agree the growth risk is real for Vietnam’s port industry, especially for exposed players like Gemalink.

5. Gemadept and Gemalink's Strategic Responses

Management response: Shortly after the U.S. announced the new surcharge policy, Gemadept acted to reassure investors and shared its strategic adaptation roadmap. CEO Nguyen Thanh Binh acknowledged that the policy may prompt U.S. companies to seek alternative supply sources, potentially disrupting supply chains that involve Vietnamese firms. However, he assessed the impact as moderate because Gemadept had already developed contingency plans. Specifically, U.S.-bound cargo only accounts for under 10% at Nam Dinh Vu and under 20% at Gemalink, and the company has proactively diversified its market portfolio.

Key adaptation strategies:

• Diversifying services and markets: Since April 2025, Gemalink launched four new international services (to Africa, Europe, Canada, and South America), immediately reducing its U.S.-bound share from 32% to ~20%. These routes capitalize on global trends like “China+1” and growing intercontinental and intra-Asia trade. Gemadept recognizes intra-Asia trade as a high-growth segment, especially as regional cooperation intensifies and reliance on the U.S. lessens. Accordingly, Nam Dinh Vu’s capacity is being raised from 1.3 million TEUs to 2 million TEUs by end-2025 to capture new demand. Gemalink is also exploring additional long-haul opportunities (e.g., to India, the Middle East).

• Focusing on resilient cargo streams: Gemadept notes that U.S. imports into Vietnam are unlikely to be affected, and may even grow due to Vietnam's tariff cuts and rising demand for U.S. strategic goods (renewables, high-tech, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors). As Vietnam seeks to rebalance trade with the U.S., imports are expected to rise. Gemalink is positioned to handle this growth. For example, U.S. imports like cotton, soybeans, meat, and machinery could arrive at Gemalink and be distributed efficiently across Vietnam. This helps offset export volume losses. When cargo volumes rebound, Gemadept plans to fast-track Gemalink Phase 2, expanding capacity to 3 million TEUs/year.

• Close coordination with carriers and clients: CEO Nguyen Thanh Binh shared that Gemadept has engaged shipping lines and exporters to address the policy. The company has advised clients to expedite shipments ahead of the fee's effective date (within the 180-day grace period). It is also collaborating with authorities to support exporters, possibly via customs, port, or warehousing solutions to reduce costs and processing time. Given its market position, Gemadept can advocate for favorable policy adjustments to help clients through this transitional phase.

• Support from strategic partner CMA-CGM: A major advantage is Gemalink’s strong backing from CMA-CGM, a top global carrier committed to long-term cooperation. CMA-CGM remains the main volume contributor at Gemalink and has pledged to increase port calls. Despite market fluctuations, CMA-CGM is expected to maintain or expand its operations at Gemalink (e.g., launching new services or deploying additional vessels). In Q1 2025, CMA-CGM and Ocean Alliance members adjusted their networks and reaffirmed Gemalink as a key Vietnam stop. This commitment ensures stable volume at the port and prevents abandonment during disruptions. Furthermore, Gemalink continues to attract other alliances: in 2025, Premier Alliance (HMM, ONE, Yang Ming) added Gemalink to its FE4 Asia–Europe route—testament to the port’s competitiveness. Having a broader carrier base reduces overreliance risk.

• Ongoing capacity investment: Despite short-term challenges, Gemadept is not scaling back its investments. Instead, it is accelerating major infrastructure projects. Gemalink Phase 2 is expected to start soon (investment license already filed), aiming to double capacity to ~3 million TEUs. In parallel, Gemadept plans to participate in new port developments (e.g., Gemalink 2A, 2B and a VND 50 trillion port at Cai Mep). This long-term vision underscores Gemadept’s commitment to deep-water terminals as core growth drivers, regardless of temporary trade headwinds. Management believes that once the current turbulence passes, volumes will recover strongly, and the expanded ports will prove highly valuable.

Summary: Gemadept and Gemalink have responded proactively and confidently to the U.S. policy. Leveraging their relatively low U.S. exposure, they are reshaping route portfolios and exploiting emerging markets (intra-Asia, Europe, Africa, Americas). Management remains optimistic that “opportunities for growth and investment still abound,” reinforcing investor confidence that Gemadept can weather this challenging period.

6. Expert Views on Impact at Cai Mep–Thi Vai and Gemalink

Industry experts broadly agree that the Cai Mep–Thi Vai cluster—Vietnam’s main Trans-Pacific gateway—will be among the most affected by the U.S. fee. MB Securities (MBS) outlines three macro-level impacts: (1) reduced competitiveness of Vietnam’s key U.S. exports (due to higher costs and loss of tariff advantages), (2) potential for Vietnam to face the highest retaliatory tariffs in Southeast Asia, undermining its attractiveness for relocating FDI (especially “China+1”), and (3) pressure to boost U.S. imports to reduce surplus, which may strain foreign exchange reserves. Together, these factors could slow trade growth and curb port demand.

At the industry level, Mr. Truong Hien Phuong (KIS) states that Vietnam’s port sector will face notable headwinds from the U.S. policy, as both exports and imports may be adversely affected. He expects exporters to adjust product lines and pricing to bypass the fees, which will in turn delay cargo flows and hurt port revenues.

In a sector report, BSC classified port operators among the most vulnerable to the U.S. retaliatory tariff package (alongside tires, paper, garments, seafood, wood). BSC estimates that ~30% of Vietnam’s container volume is tied to the U.S. market. If demand falls due to higher costs, 2025 throughput will decline. Deep-water ports like Gemalink, CMIT, and TCIT—which specialize in long-haul U.S. routes—will be hit hardest. Hence, Gemalink and Gemadept are among the most exposed players in the port sector.

Still, some experts strike a cautiously optimistic tone. They believe that if companies adapt quickly and seize new trade flows, the actual impact may be limited. First, the phased rollout allows time for global shipping realignment. Second, structural changes in shipping alliances in 2025 present fresh opportunities for Vietnamese ports. For example, with the breakup of the 2M Alliance, new groupings like Ocean Alliance (expanded), Premier Alliance, and Gemini Alliance have emerged. According to Vietnam Industry & Trade Journal, Cai Mep–Thi Vai is expected to gain new U.S.-bound services as these alliances optimize their networks.

Indeed, Gemalink is already capitalizing on this transition. In early 2025, Premier Alliance selected Gemalink as its Vietnam hub for the FE4 Asia–Europe service. This marked an expansion of strategic cooperation between Gemalink and top-tier carriers beyond its traditional Ocean Alliance partners. Diversifying its client base boosts Gemalink’s volumes beyond U.S.-bound cargo and elevates its international stature.

In March 2025, Gemalink successfully received the HMM Oslo (operated by HMM, Korea)—the first vessel of the FE4 Asia–Europe service under Premier Alliance. The ship measures 399 meters in length with ~16,000 TEU capacity—among the world’s largest container ships. This proves Gemalink’s ability to handle megaships and meet stringent alliance standards. In a broader context, Gemalink is aggressively expanding its intercontinental service portfolio to offset any U.S.-related losses.

Outlook: Despite the turbulence, long-term prospects for Vietnam’s port sector remain strong. The country has robust export manufacturing, a strategic location on global trade routes, and continually improving infrastructure. Trade policy shocks (like the U.S. surcharge) are temporary, while global demand for seaborne logistics continues to grow. Regulators are also optimistic: Deputy Minister Nguyen Xuan Sang highlighted Vietnam’s ability to accommodate 250,000 DWT vessels and offer competitive port costs regionally—an edge in attracting global cargo.

Conclusion: The U.S. port fee on Chinese-built vessels presents a meaningful challenge for Gemadept and Gemalink, mainly via risk of reduced U.S.-bound cargo. However, with their deep-water capacity, strategic partnerships (like CMA-CGM), and flexible adaptation (market diversification, intra-Asia growth, stronger imports), both firms are actively managing the downside. Global shifts in maritime logistics may even create opportunities to replace lost volume. Over the long run, Gemalink is poised to remain a vital export-import hub for Vietnam and a key growth driver for Gemadept.

Sources: USTR, CNBC, Vietnambiz, Tinnhanhchungkhoan, KIS, BSC, MBS, Vietnam Industry & Trade Journal, Nhịp sống Kinh doanh.